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SUMMARYAND EVALUATION
THE ISSUE OF THE RELATIONSHIP between the personal economic
objectives of the senior corporate executive and the pecuniary interests
of his firm's common stockholders has been a topic for scholarly
discussion ever since it became apparent that the large aggregations
of scarce resources demanded by industrialization would require an
increasingly professionalized managerial group for successful admin-
istration. The consequent separation of the capital-supply and capital-
management functions raised the possibility that the decision-making
process within the firm would take on a different character, and be
directed toward different goals, than was true in a simpler commer-
cial environment wherein the two functions resided in the same
individuals. The usual conclusion in the literature of business and
economics over the past several decades has been that this possibility
has indeed become a reality, and that a viable mechanism no longer
exists for eliciting a congruence of managerial and ownership objec-
tives in the operation of the widely held corporate enterprise.
The task of the present investigation has been to raise anew the
question of the soundness of that conclusion. Because our tax laws
encourage corporations to reward their employees through devices
which depend for their value on the market price behavior of the
company's common shares, and because even a casual inspection of
annual proxy statements suggests that many top executives maintain
significant direct equity investments in their own firms, the chance
that a more important link than was generally recognized existed
between the personal income of management and the returns which
shareholders enjoy seemed worth examining. The evidence offered in
the preceding chapters appears to support this hypothesis. The annual
income of executives depends very heavily, very directly, and very
persistently, on the dividends received and capital gains experiencedSUMMARY AND EVALUATION 151
by such men in their roles both as stockholders of their employer
companies, and as beneficiaries of stock-related compensation ar-
rangements. Accordingly, the often-expressed concern that the pro-
fessional manager is likely to display a massive indifference to the
traditional profit-seeking orientation of the firm is regarded here
with skepticism, despite the unarguable shift from entrepreneurship
to administration as the dominant activity of the executive class.
The Data
The senior officers of three categories of firms were chosen as the
sample to which the analysis was addressed. The main focus was on
a group of fifty large manufacturing corporations, with data from
fifteen small manufacturers and fifteen chain-store retailing organ-
izations being compiled to supplement and test the broader applica-
bility of the initial findings. The investigation covered the period from
1940 through 1963, thereby encompassing an interval in which a
number of major structural changes occurred in the economy. Out
of the extensive body of evidence developed, the particular set of
figures which seems to provide the best summary of the historical
record is gathered in Table 48 and depicted in Chart 17. These
figures portray the ratio, year by year, of total ownership-related
after-tax personal executive income to concurrent after-tax fixed-
dollar employee remuneration for all three company samples. The
group considered consists of the five highest-paid individuals in each
firm taken together, and the underlying data are the mean annual
values determined after exclusion of extreme observations of stock-
holding and compensation. Thus, the time series shown are the final
columns of Tables 24, 35, and 46, above, in which the relationships
between ownership income and remuneration were documented for
the top-five category in the three samples separately.
These figures are taken to represent the most suitable synthesis of
the results of the analysis because, first of all, they do abstract from
the effects of extraordinary individual circumstances. While the full-
sample averages would tell a much more impressive story, they are
apt to be misleading as measures of the norm for the relevant152 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
TABLE 48
The Importance of Ownership Income to Senior Executives:
A Summary for the Years 1940 Through 1963 for the Top Five
Executives in Each Firm, Extreme Values Deleted
Ratio of Dividends Plus
Compensation









1940 0.757 0.443 1.245
1941 0.684 0.766 2.223
1942 0.830 0.501 L143
1943 1.039 1.482 2.118
1944 0.741 0.951 2.160
1945 1.466 3.168 2.063
1946 0.685 1.069 1.407
1947 0.441 0.568 1.200
1948 0.230 0.357 0.581
1949 0.434 0.504 0.317
1950 0.690 0.863 0.4 18
1951 0.595 0.389 0.320
1952 0.636 0.304 0.276
1953 0.524 0.262 0.232
1954 1.887 0.784 0.521
1955 1.502 0.635 0.508
1956 1.520 0.440 0.685
1957 1.627 0.326 0.631
1958 3.007 1.047 1.213
1959 2.170 0.654 0.559
1960 2.803 0.832 0.760
1961 3.425 1.675 0.981
1962 2.673 0.899 1.134
1963 2.287 1.307 1.191
Averages for:
1940—44 0.799 0.801 1.752
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managerial group. The severe impact of eliminating extreme values
from the small-manufacturing data perhaps best illustrates this con-
cern. Secondly, it seems desirable to cast up the findings from as
broad a base as possible. Even though the differences between the
experience of the highest-paid man in each firm, and the five highest-
paid together, turned out to be of interest in several contexts, the
latter group—which isthe largest the available proxy statement
information permits to be examined—serves as the better vehicle for
summarizing over-all income patterns at the senior executive level.
Finally, the addition of the value of stock-related compensation to
annual dividends and capital gains in making comparisons with
fixed-dollar earnings provides a more comprehensive index of the
true degree of executive exposure to the contingencies and uncer-
tainties of ownership than the dividends and gains alone would furnish.
The securities market's response to the firm's activities is as much a
determinant of the worth of stock-based pay arrangements as it is the
genesis of shareholder returns. For these reasons, Table 48 and Chart
17 appear to combine the most meaningful, as well as the most com-
prehensive, elements of the historical income profile.
The impression they convey is one of substantial involvement on
the part of executives in the ongoing rewards and penalties of an
equity or equitylike position. The average annual after-tax incre-
ments to personal managerial wealth which arose from ownership-
connected income sources after 1960 exceeded the corresponding
increments from fixed-dollar employee remuneration for all three
samples. In the case of large manufacturing company executives, in
particular, ownership items were nearly three times the size of fixed-
dollar earnings. The conclusion therefore would be that the personal
economic well-being of the senior professional manager is, of neces-
sity, tied very closely to that of his firm's shareholders—sufficiently
closely, in the view here, as to imply that the pursuit of administrative
policies inimical to the profit objectives of shareholders would be
irrational in terms of the man's own self-interest. A finding that the
executive stands to gain much more from the successful operation of
the firm than from the mere retention of his job follows, it should
be emphasized, from an investigation which has focused on preciselySUMMARY AND EVALUATION 155
thoselarge and widely held enterprises that are most frequently cited
as examples of the disengagement of management from Ownership
attitudes and sanctions. As it happens, executives are not insulated
from the consequences of poor company performance—even in the
short run—and are demonstrably able to reap significant benefits
from a successful situation.
The pattern of changes over the years in the strength of the owner-
ship income link is also worth noting. For both the large-manufactur-
ing, and retail-trade, samples, ownership returns were more important
in the 1960's than they had been during the early 1940's, whereas
a decline is observable for the senior officers of small-manufacturing
firms. A consistent tendency toward a growing importance in all
three cases would, of course, reinforce the interpretation placed here
on the data. A more careful look at the findings, however—especially
as portrayed in Chart 17—suggests that a generalized upward trend
is indeed present. The ratio of dividends plus gains plus stock com-
pensation to fixed-dollar inflows can be seen to have bottomed out
in the late 1940's and early 1950's for every sample, and to have
risen in a clear and fairly steady manner ever since.1 The fact that
the ratios in the 1960's for the small-manufacturing sample are still
below their prewar levels thus seems less relevant than the evidence
as to what has been happening in the interim. From that standpoint,
an increasing secular role in the executive income structure for own-
ership elements is apparent throughout. This phenomenon can be
expected to continue in the future if only as a consequence of the
growing reliance by corporations on stock-related pay arrangements
for their top officials. The analysis in Chapter 3 of the managerial
compensation package enjoyed by all three groups amply documents
this expectation.
One feature of the data in recent years which runs particularly
counter to the usual folklore is the greater relative dependence of
income on stock price changes and company dividends evinced among
executives of very large firms as compared with their counterparts
in smaller organizations. Quite the reverse circumstance would almost
1Theavailability to executives of such instruments as stock options, begin-
fling in the early 1950's, undoubtedly contributed to this recovery of ownership.156 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
certainly be the prediction in most of the current literature.2 As we
found earlier, differences both in the magnitude of the stockholdings
in question and in the use of stock-based instruments of remuneration
account for this conclusion. Whatever their source, the figures belie
the contention that the more a growing enterprise requires profes-
sional administration, the less likely are the interests, of shareholders
to be translated into an effective personal monetary payoff for
management consistent with those interests.3
Commentary
The foregoing arguments, it may be recalled, would be buttressed
substantially were we to employ the full-sample time series of Tables
19, 32, and 43 in the comparisons. Moreover, the figures in Table
48 almost certainly understate the case as they stand, because it has
been assumed implicitly in our discussions that there is no real con-
nection between any of the fixed-dollar rewards which executives
receive and the performance of their companies. To the extent that
such a relationship does exist, the income link reported here will
emerge in still bolder relief. That issue has been addressed elsewhere
by the author with encouraging results.4 There turns out to be a
definite and persistent correlation between the salaries and bonuses
of the senior corporate executives in the large-manufacturing sample 6
andthe profits and equity market values of their employer firms. By
2Andquite the reverse can, of course, be seen in Table 48 to have been
true during the 1940's.
There is, on the other hand, the possibility of some bias in this respect in
the small-firm sample. Since the information contained in corporate proxy
statements is necessary to the analysis—and since closely held firms where the
management and ownership groups are one and the same are not ordinarily
forced by SEC regulations to issue proxy statements—we may end up including
in the sample predominantly those smaller firms in which management's equity
position is fairly small. Nonetheless, the point that large company size is by
no means a deterrent to a significant interdependence between executive in-
comes and stockholder returns is strongly supported by the data.
W. 0. Lewellen and A. B. Huntsman, "Managerial Pay and Corporate Per-
formance," American Economic Review, Vol. LX, No. 4 (September 1970).
Only the large-manfacturing sample was examined in this manner, since the
sample sizes in the retail trade and small-manufacturing groups were too small
to allow the execution of meaningful statistical tests of significance.SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 157
the same token, it was found that no systematic link between cash
compensation and the most commonly proposed nonprofit measure
of company size—annual. sales volume—could be established. Thus,
in a cross-sectional multiple regression framework, the profit and
equity market value coefficients tested as significant at the .01 level
in virtually every year, whereas the sales coefficients were nowhere
significant. Those elements of the managerial pay package which are
not automatically tied to company success as shareholders perceive
it, can therefore be shown to be tied indirectly through extant corpo-
rate compensation practices.
The Compensation Record
While the historical evidence relating to executive remuneration has
been utilized primarily as a frame of reference for a treatment of the
impact of stock ownership patterns,that evidence merits some
attention in its own right. We observe that total after-tax executive
pay—whether defined for the highest-paid indivduals in the respective
firms or for the five highest-paid combined—almost exactly doubled
between 1940 and 1963 within each sample at issue. The consistency
of this finding for three such diverse segments of the economy is
striking enough to imply that the phenomenon may be a general
characteristic of the structure of managerial rewards, as it has devel-
oped during the last quarter-century under the pressure of major
revisions in federal tax policy. The impact of taxes is clearly discern-
ible, both in the shift away from direct cash payments over time
toward an increasing emphasis on deferred and contingent compen-
sation devices for all firms, and in the interfirm differences within
given years in the implementation of those devices. For example,
large manufacturing corporations—wherein the aggregate levels of
executive remuneration were highest—relied most heavily on non-
current rewards as vehicles for sidestepping the effect df progressive
ordinary personal tax rates. The somewhat smaller amounts of com-
pensation recorded among the retail trade group were comprised
proportionately less of deferred arrangements, and the still lower-
paying small manufacturing sample emphasized cash compensation158 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
most strongly. The logic of tax planning, therefore, appears to have
made the appropriate impression. Recognition that many of the newer
deferred and contingent instruments adopted are designed around
shares of the employer corporation's common stock as the means of
payment is, of course, a key element in our investigation of the
management-shareholder income relationship.
Ownership Proportions
A sidelight to that relationship is the secular decline in the fraction
of their firm's outstanding equity securities which senior executives
hold. A drop from 1940 to 1963 in percentage ownership occurred
in each of the three samples, although the. usefulness of this observa-
tion must be qualified by noting that the holdings involved were so
small throughout—i.e., most often in the range of1 per cent or
less of the outstanding shares of the sample companies—that even
large variations within that range do not appear to be of much real
significance. A decline of this sort is, nonetheless, a standard bench
mark for discussions which seek to establish the progressive dis-
sociation of management from an identification with shareholder
interests. While not denying that today's executives do own a rather
smaller fraction of their companies' total common stock than was
true of their predecessors in 1940, the contention here is that the
relative importance of the income flows attendant upon such own-
ership in the aggregate personal income profile of the individual
executive should be our concern instead. So long as those flows
account for as much of observable annual increments to wealth as
they currently do, a sensitivity by management to the shareholder
viewpoint seems a reasonable expectation, regardless of whether or
not substantial percentage minority ownership positions are involved.
Portfolio Turnover
Another dimension of the executive's stance toward the organization
for which he works has to do with the degree to which the portfolio
commitments in the company's shares that he undertakes are specu-SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 159
lativein nature. If we should discover that the senior management
group is continually engaged in a great deal of short-term trading,
riding the peaks and troughs of market sentiment on inside informa-
tion, this would negate the conclusion that an effective and beneficial
exposure to the ongoing contingencies of ownership prevails. Quite
the reverse situation, however, is indicated by the data. Executives
overwhelmingly buy and hold, as evidenced by the finding that in the
large-manufacturing and retail-tradesamples,transactions which
resulted in a reduction in a man's own-firm stockholdings occurred,
on the average, in just one out of every six years of his career expe-
rience. In the case of the small-manufacturing category, the rate was
an even lower one year out of ten. Put differently, the annual capital
gains and losses listed in the comparisons with executive compensa-
tion are predominantly accrued rather than realized increments, im-
plying that the typical upper-level professional manager in fact fore-
goes possible speculative profits in favor of the kind of long-term
participation in company fortunes that would support the arguments
offered here.
The Remainder of the Portfolio
One aspect of the personal circumstances of the men in the sample
which•has not been examined, and which would bear on the credibility
of the conclusions drawn, concerns the role which the observed
employer-company stockholdings play in the total executive securities
portfolio. We may be able to assert that the dividends, capital gains,
and stock-related rewards which result from an individual's employ-
ment and investment association with his firm dominate the total
income flows generated from that source, but the inference that this
is an important phenomenon in terms of identifying with share-
holder objectives would lose some of its impact if the men involved
had such large aggregate securities portfolios that the items we can
measure were trivial in comparison with the dividends, capital gains,
and interest earnings from other investments. Since no data exist
which permit a determination of the size of the remainder of executive
portfolios—holdings only in one's own company being reported in160 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
proxy statements—it is difficult to assess the extent to which the
analysis would be modified by a more comprehensive set of figures.
There is cause to suspect that the bulk of senior management's
investments must indeed be comprised of employer-company shares
if only because the magnitude of the holdings we can observe already
surpasses what would seem a reasonable expectation of total executive
wealth. A finding that average per capita ownership positions are in
the neighborhood of $2.5 million (for the full-sample large manu-
facturing group) or even $1 million (when extreme values are elim-
inated) exceeds by a substantial margin at least this writer's ex ante
notions of likely dollar amounts. Offhand, it is hard to see how these
men could have funds left for alternative portfolio commitments.
Furthermore, if we believe that executives, like other investors, are
most comfortable when investing with knowledge, we would expect
them to be strongly attracted to their own corporation's securities
simply because they know more about those firms than they do about
any others. Considerations of broad portfolio diversification might,
in short, be given less personal weight by top management than by
the investment community in general. These interpretationsare,
however, quite unsupported by empirical evidence and must remain
conjectural. Clearly, there is a need for additional research. The feel-
ing here is that just as ownership returns predominate in the observ-
able executive income profile, so do employer-company stockholdings
predominate in the total executive securities portfolio. Nonetheless,
it must be admitted that if the latter contention should prove incor-
rect, the implications of the former would be diluted.
The Merger Trend
On the other side of the coin, there have been some recent develop-
ments in the business environment which should operate to heighten
senior executives' sensitivity to the issue of profit maximization or
share price maximization, even apart from the factors considered in
the current discussion. Beginning in the 1960's, a significant upsurge
in the frequency—some might say, the audacity—of corporate merger
efforts has become apparent, resulting in the formation of a wideSUMMARY AND EVALUATION 161
variety of so-called conglomerate enterprises. The intensity of this
activity suggests that very few top management groups nowadays can
afford the luxury of less than full attention toward utilizing their
company's resources in an efficient manner, on penalty of having
some more vigorous organization go over their heads directly to
shareholders with the promise of improved performance. Today's
captains of industry, in effect, expose themselves to the distinct
prospect of being demoted to lieutenants if they do not address their
responsibilities in a way that produces adequate returns to owners.
The fact that the demotion is apt to originate with some third party
makes it no less a real concern, and the demonstrated skill of that
third party in implementing the rebellion may make the threat more
persuasive than one arising from a coalition of dissatisfied current
stockholders.
Summary
The contention, then, is that there exist a number of mechanisms
which should go a long way toward overcoming any tendency for the
separation of corporate owners and managers in the contemporary
economy to be accompanied by a separation of their respective
interests and objectives. The attempt has been to document—and to
appraise the dimensions of—what seems likely to be the most impor-
tant such mechanism: the link between executives' personal incomes
and the market returns to shareholders. Upon investigation of the
historical compensation and ownership experience of a large and
diverse sample of senior corporate officers, that link has been shown
to be strong, immediate, and persistent. While the evidence presented
obviously cannot be described as a proof that executives will necessar-
ily perform their duties with the welfare of stockholders paramount
in their minds, it can be offered as clear support for the proposition
that it would be very much in their self-interest to do so. The findings
are at least consistent with the notion that "what's good for the com-
pany is good for the executive." To date, the contrary viewpoint has
not had the benefit of similar hard evidence.APPENDIXES